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Distinguished ladies and gentlemen, I am delighted to be with you
today to give the Frederick K. Cox International Law Center Lecture
on Global Justice. Allow me to thank the Case Western Reserve
University School of Law for inviting me to speak to you. I look
forward to our discussion.
In June of this year, I took up the function of Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court, an international, independent, judicial
institution that started its activities ten years ago.
After ten years in operation, an overview and definition of the
new perspectives related to international criminal justice is essential
for reviewing and further improving the operations of the Court.
Within the Office of the Prosecutor, this exercise has coincided
with the transitional period, which started last December following
my election by the Assembly of States Parties and completed on June
15 when I officially took up my duties. 1
It is almost an understatement to say that the world today is very
different than what it was ten years ago. In 2002, the aim was to
establish an innovative and unprecedented institution created by the
Rome Statute: the first independent, impartial, and permanent

*

Mrs. Bensouda is the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.
She was elected to this position on December 12, 2011 and sworn in on
June 15, 2012. Previously, she served as the Deputy Prosecutor. Prior to
her work at the International Criminal Court, Mrs. Bensouda worked as
Legal Adviser and Trial Attorney at the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in Arusha, Tanzania, rising to the position
of Senior Legal Advisor and Head of The Legal Advisory Unit. Before
joining the ICTR, she was General Manager of a leading commercial
bank in The Gambia. Between 1987 and 2000, she was successively
Senior State Counsel, Principal State Counsel, Deputy Director of
Public Prosecutions, Solicitor General and Legal Secretary of the
Republic, and Attorney General and Minister of Justice, in which
capacity she served as Chief Legal Advisor to the President and Cabinet
of The Republic of The Gambia. Mrs. Bensouda holds a masters degree
in International Maritime Law and Law of The Sea and as such is the
first international maritime law expert of The Gambia.

1.

Mrs. Fatou Bensouda, ICC Prosecutor, INT’L CRIM. CT., http:
//www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Office+of+
the+Prosecutor/Biographies/TheProsecutor2012.htm (last visited Nov.
13, 2012).
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international criminal court. 2 In 2002, the stakes were high: would
this new judicial institution be able to assert itself in the
international arena? Would it be able to open and successfully carry
out a case? Could the Court be anything other than a paper tiger, an
abortive project generating legal and academic debates but with no
role to play in managing mass violence in real time, and with no hope
of contributing effectively to the prevention of such violence?
Ten years on, an objective observation would provide positive
answers to all of these questions. The International Criminal Court,
by virtue of its mandate and operations in the last ten years, has
introduced a new paradigm in international relations: utilizing law as
a global tool to promote peace and international security.
To what does the Court today owe its status and legitimacy as a
major actor on the international scene in relation to justice and
conflict management? I would like to suggest two main causes.
Firstly, its operational framework—its mandate—as defined by the
Rome Statute; and secondly, the standardized, clear, transparent, and
predictable working methods of the Office of the Prosecutor,
providing it with the necessary legitimacy as a strictly judicial actor,
in order to function effectively in a highly political international
environment.
Ladies and Gentlemen, allow me now to briefly present the four
cardinal points, the four key elements of the model of international
criminal justice established by the Rome Statute, which in my opinion
explain why this model is both legitimate and sustainable.
First, the International Criminal Court is permanent and could
potentially have worldwide jurisdiction. Differing from other
models—from the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals to the courts
dealing with the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and
Cambodia—the Court is a permanent actor with non-retroactive 3 and
potentially universal jurisdiction, 4 which provides it with further
legitimacy. These characteristics of the Court also encourage States as
well as other international actors to realign their positions in
accordance with the norms of the Court and to build a relationship
and a model of cooperation over the long term.

2.

See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 12, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 900, pmbl. [hereinafter Rome Statute] (“Determined . . .
to establish an independent permanent International Criminal Court in
relationship with the United Nations system, with jurisdiction over the
most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a
whole . . . .”).

3.

Id. art 24.

4.

See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 125(3) (“This Statute shall be open
to accession by all States. Instruments of accession shall be deposited
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.”).
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Second, the Court is independent, as is its Prosecutor. 5 So, it is
the Prosecutor who, with complete independence and on the basis of
the criteria laid down by the Rome Statute, initiates preliminary
examinations, selects situations and cases, and decides whether or not
to open an investigation into a situation referred by a State or the
United Nations Security Council. 6 The Prosecutor also has the
capacity, of course, to open investigations proprio motu, with the
authorization of the judges. 7 Independence is the most fundamental
component of the legitimacy of our mandate and work, and the main
source of the impact of the Court on international relations,
particularly its preventative impact.
Complementarity is one of the founding principles of the Rome
Statute model. 8 States have primacy in terms of investigations and
proceedings; the ICC was established as a court of last resort. 9 It is
within this context that the Office of the Prosecutor has developed its
policy of positive complementarity, namely, a proactive policy of
cooperation and consultation, aimed at promoting national
proceedings and at positioning itself as a sword of Damocles, ready to
intervene in the event of unwillingness or inability by national
authorities. 10 The Rome Statute did not just create a Court, but also
5.

See generally Rome Statute, supra note 2, pmbl. (“Determined to these
ends and for the sake of present and future generations, to establish an
independent permanent International Criminal Court in relationship
with the United Nations system. . . .”); id. art. 42(1) (“The Office of the
Prosecutor shall act independently as a separate organ of the Court.”).

6.

See id. art. 15 (describing the authority of the Prosecutor to initiate
investigations).

7.

Id.

8.

See id. art. 1 (stating the Court “shall be complementary to national
criminal jurisdictions”).

9.

See id. art. 17(1).

10.

OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, PROSECUTORIAL STRATEGY 2009-2012 ¶ 16
(Feb. 1, 2010), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/66A
8DCDC-3650-4514-AA62D229D1128F65/281506/OTPProsecutorialStr
ategy20092013.pdf.
According to the Statute, States have the primary responsibility
for preventing and punishing atrocities in their own territories.
In this design, intervention by the Office is exceptional – it will
only step in when States fail to conduct genuine investigations
and prosecutions. This principle of complementarity has two
dimensions: (i) the admissibility test, i.e. how to assess the
existence of national proceedings and their genuineness, which is
a judicial issue; and (ii) the positive complementarity concept,
i.e. a proactive policy of cooperation aimed at promoting
national proceedings.
Id.
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a system of global criminal justice, within which national, regional,
and international actors operate, in addition to other mechanisms of
justice and reconciliation. Such interdependent and complementary
action must guarantee that justice is rendered for all crimes
committed in a given situation and ensure that impunity is
eliminated.
Finally, the fourth key element of the Rome system is the role of
the Court in preventing and managing conflicts. The preamble to
the Statute gives the Court the mandate to “contribute to the
prevention of . . . crimes.” 11 Recently, thanks in particular to the
intervention by the Court and the Office of the Prosecutor, judicial
issues have begun to form part of the considerations of the
international community regarding international peace and security.
An example of this is the unanimous referral of the situation in Libya
by the United Nations Security Council. 12 The importance of the
preliminary examinations phase, which gives the States concerned
the possibility of intervening to put an end to crimes before the Office
of the Prosecutor initiates an investigation, 13 should be highlighted
here. This phase enables the Office of the Prosecutor to act as a
catalyst for national proceedings.
Ladies and Gentlemen, allow me now to say a few words about
the working methods developed by the Office of the Prosecutor since
the start of its operations which have enabled it to strengthen the
legitimacy of its work and helped it to position the institution as a
major actor in the conflict prevention and management. The
publication of various documents on general policy and our
prosecutorial strategy, the adoption of an operational manual,
learning from previous experiences, and the transitional process
between the first Prosecutor and myself, have helped my Office to
fully standardize and enhance its operational process. This process is
based on three fundamental phases.
First, the preliminary examination phase: a policy document
was prepared almost two years ago following a process of consultation
with our partners—states, civil society, and international, and
regional organizations. 14 The preliminary examination phase allows
11.

Rome Statute, supra note 2, pmbl.

12.

See S.C. Res. 1970, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26. 2011).

13.

See Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, Int’l Crim. Ct. ¶ 13
(Oct. 4, 2010), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/E278
F5A2-A4F9-43D7-83D2-6A2C9CF5D7D7/282515/OTP_Draftpoli
cypaperonpreliminaryexaminations04101.pdf
(“Before
making
a
determination on whether to initiate an investigation, the Office [of the
Prosecutor] will also seek to ensure that the States and other parties
concerned have had the opportunity to provide the information they
consider appropriate.”).

14.

See generally id.
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various actors to have the opportunity to take action. 15 The objective
is to ensure that the Office will contribute to the prevention or
cessation of abuses by establishing transparent communication and
ensuring predictability of its judicial activities. 16
The Office thus examines the extent to which its preliminary
examination activities can serve to stimulate genuine national
proceedings against those who appear to bear the greatest
responsibility for the most serious crimes. This phase is one of the
most remarkable efficiency tools we have at our disposal as it
encourages national prosecutions and prevents or puts an end to
abuses. Thus, this process allows the Court to avoid opening
investigations and prosecutions when national mechanisms are
functioning in accordance with our founding Statute. This is what we
are doing in Colombia, Georgia, and Guinea. 17
Second, at the end of the preliminary examination process, on the
basis of criteria set out in the Statute and on the basis of available
evidence, we have to establish whether or not there are reasonable
grounds to open an investigation into a given situation. 18 Before
opening an investigation or requesting authorization from the PreTrial Chamber, our policy is to inform the relevant State officials and
offer them the option to refer the situation to the Court with the aim
of increasing the prospects of cooperation inter alia. 19 This is what we
have done with regards to the situations in the Democratic Republic
of Congo and Uganda, for example. 20
If the relevant State chooses not to refer the situation, the Office
remains prepared at all times to proceed proprio motu, as was done in
the Kenya situation. 21 In this case, after consultations with the
national authorities over a possible referral, the Kenyan government
decided to support proprio motu action by the ICC, stating that it
remained fully committed to discharging its primary responsibility to
establish a local judicial mechanism to deal with the perpetrators of
the post-election violence and that it remained committed to
cooperating with the ICC. 22 Pursuant to the principle of
independence, the policy of inviting referrals remains without
prejudice to the case selection and prosecutorial strategy of the Office.
15.

Id. ¶ 94.

16.

Id. ¶ 20.

17.

Id. ¶ 31.

18.

Id. ¶¶ 27, 45.

19.

Id. ¶ 16.

20.

Id. ¶ 28.

21.

Id. ¶ 81.

22.

Id.
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Finally, the Office of the Prosecutor is provided with the
discretion to select cases. 23 In its September 2003 policy document,
the Office established that, on the basis of the Statute, and given the
Court’s limited resources, the Office of the Prosecutor ought to focus
the efforts and resources employed in investigation and prosecution on
persons bearing the greatest responsibility, like heads of States or
other organizations presumed to be responsible for these crimes. 24
This policy of focused prosecutions encourages marginalization of high
level suspects which may lead to demobilization of armed groups. It
also, through the principle of complementarity, encourages national
authorities and other justice and reconciliation mechanisms to
guarantee that the minor perpetrators of serious crimes are brought to
justice as well.
The Office is equally responsible for drawing particular attention
to sexual and gender-based crimes, in addition to crimes against
children. Since its inception, the Office has sought to file charges
accordingly in the great majority of its cases. This will continue to be
one of my priorities over the course of my mandate.
One key point remains: in selecting its cases, the Office of the
Prosecutor cannot yield to political considerations or adapt its work
according to the peace negotiations timetable. It must always conduct
its work on the basis of the law and of the evidence it has collected,
and act accordingly, in an independent manner. However, the Office
of the Prosecutor may, and has so far endeavoured to, announce the
various phases of its work in advance, thereby permitting other
actors, through its transparency and predictability, to adapt to the
on-going judicial process.
Thus, in December 2007, the Office of the Prosecutor announced
to the Security Council that it would investigate those within the
Sudanese government who were protecting and supporting Ahmad
Harun. 25 Six months later, in July 2008, the Office requested an arrest
warrant for the Sudanese President, Omar al-Bashir. 26 In the course
23.

Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 15.

24.

Office of the Prosecutor, Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office
of the Prosecutor 3 (Sept. 2003), available at http://www.icccpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/1FA7C4C6-DE5F-42B7-8B25-60AA962ED8B6
/143594/030905_Policy_Paper.pdf.

25.

See generally Office of the Prosecutor, Sixth Report of the Prosecutor of
the International Criminal Court to the UN Security Council Pursuant
to UNSCR 1593 (2005) (Dec. 5, 2007); Press Release, Security Council,
International Criminal Court Prosecutor Tells Security Council Sudan’s
Government “Not Cooperating” in Darfur Investigation, Massive Crimes
Continue, U.N. Press Release SC/9186 (Dec. 5, 2007).

26.

Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.icccpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation
%20icc%200205/related%20cases/icc02050109/icc02050109?lan=en-GB
(last visited Nov. 13, 2012).
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of these six months, the international community could have made
preparations to support the action taken by the Office of the
Prosecutor; but it did not and, therefore, an opportunity to put an
end to the genocide in Darfur was missed.
Ladies and Gentlemen, the issues faced by the Court today are no
longer the same as in 2002. The Court no longer risks being an
irrelevant entity: it has become a key actor on the international scene.
Nevertheless, other challenges have presented themselves.
First and foremost, the Court’s independence risks being
attacked. Independence should not be taken for granted. National or
community interests may provide incentives to control the Court
through the undue strengthening of States’ oversight prerogatives.
Even though these are accepted diplomatic practices in the
international arena, they will harm the system established by the
Rome Statute which is based on the concept of independent judicial
activity. Without its independence, the Court is worthless. The
second risk possible is the isolation of the Court. Reality has
shown that some leaders sought by the Court have threatened to
commit more crimes to retain power, 27 thus blackmailing the
international community by imposing on it an unbearable choice:
peace or justice. The effectiveness of the Court will depend on how
the political leaders and conflict managers respond to such blackmail.
The third and final issue is cooperation. After ten years in
operation, we have established a system that is operational. But in
order to maximize our role and impact, as well as improving our
effectiveness, we need the sustained cooperation of all the States
Parties to the Statute.
For the Court to be effective, it needs the strong and unwavering
support of all the relevant actors, in keeping with its judicial mandate
and its independence. It is with this support that the preventative
potential of the Court and its impact on conflict management will be
able to express itself. This is the objective we must achieve. I hope I
can count on the support of those present here today to help us get
there.

27.

See Xan Rice & Tania Branigan, Sudanese President Expels Aid
Agencies, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 5, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2009/mar/05/sudan-aid-agencies-expelled (“The Sudanese president, Omar al-Bashir, has reacted defiantly to his arrest warrant for war
crimes in Darfur, vowing to act ‘decisively’ towards anyone threatening
the country’s stability and announcing the expulsion of 10 international
aid organisations today.”).
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